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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Calvin Champ Strange is appealing from the order of the district court
denying his motion for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
The State charged Strange with possession of a controlled substance,
felon in possession of a firearm, and misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp. 7, 36-37.) The charge of felon in possession of a firearm
was dismissed before trial. (R. pp. 50-51, 54-55.)
In August, 2007, the case went to trial (R., pp. 58-72) on the remaining
two charges and Strange was convicted on both (R., p. 71-73). Two months
after the trial was over, in October, 2007, the district court received a letter from
one of the jurors. (R., pp. 80-81.) Juror Wendy Muir reported "two things that
were worrisome for me as a juror." (R., p. 80.) The first issue raised questioned
why a silver cigarette case had not been fingerprinted and the results reported to
the jury. The second concern Muir had was whether the jury could hear during
the trial proceedings. Muir stated that the juror sitting next to her could not hear,
but he, at some point, was provided with an assistive listening device. (R., pp.
80-81.) She further stated that she "had difficulty in hearing all that was being
said and others serving on the jury indicated the same thing." (R., p. 80.)
The district court provided copies of the letter to counsel and, in response,
Strange made a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. (R., pp. 7879.)

A hearing was held on Strange's motions to vacate sentencing, for a new

trial, and to release juror information. (R., pp. 90-91 .) At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court granted Strange leave to subpoena the jurors. (R., p.
91 ; Tr., p. 129, Ls. 5-18.)
Eleven of the twelve jurors gave testimony about their trial experiences.
(R. pp. 95-96, Tr. p.132, L. 3 - p. 139, L. 3.) The district court presented findings
and conclusions as to the validity of the jurors' finding Strange guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and denied the motion for a new trial. (R., pp. 96-98.)
On the possession charge, Strange was sentenced to a unified sentence
of five years, with one-and-a-half years fixed. (R., pp. 99-101, 109-111.) On the
paraphernalia charge, Strange was sentenced to 30 days in the Washington
County Jail, to run concurrent. (R. p. 110)
appeal. (R., pp. 112-114.)

Strange filed a timely notice of

ISSUES
Strange presents the following issues on appeal:
1.

Whether the Court erred in not setting aside the Defendant's
conviction because the jury's decision was tainted by the manner
in which the jury was able to receive and hear the evidence.

2.

Whether the evidence presented and the manner in which it was
presented could sustain the Defendant's conviction on the charge

(Appellant's brief, p. 2.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Strange failed to carry his burden of establishing that the district court
erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct?

ARGUMENT
Stranqe Failed To Carrv The Burden Of Establishina That The District Court
Erred In Denvinq His Motion For A New Trial On The Basis Of Juror Misconduct
A.

Introduction
The district court made the determination that there was not enough

evidence to show that the jurors could not hear large portions of trial testimony,
according to the jurors' testimony at the hearing. Although there apparently were
times when one or more jurors found it "difficult to hear" (Tr., p. 133, Ls. 5-17),
the district court determined, according to the jurors' post-trial testimony, that
they were able to understand or decipher enough that the validity of the verdict
could not be called into question (Tr., p. 141, Ls. 14-21).
Strange asserts that the district court erred in finding that he is not entitled
to a new trial on the ground that no juror misconduct occurred when it was
discovered that some jurors allegedly could not hear all of the court proceedings.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 3-5.) Strange argues that, "[cJlearly any time jurors are
unable to understand or decipher statements by all parties involved in a criminal
trial calls into question the validity of the verdict." (Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The State submits that Strange has failed to show error in the denial of his
motion for a new trial. Specifically, he has failed to show that the factual findings
made by the district court were clearly erroneous.

B.

Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial, the

appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Cantu, 129
Idaho 673, 674, 931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997). A trial court has wide discretion to

grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and the appellate court will not disturb that
exercise of discretion, absent a showing of manifest abuse.
Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982).
-

Id.,citina State v.

Factual findings of the district court

will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.

See State v. Stefani,

142 ldaho 698,704,132 P.3d 455,461 (Ct. App. 2005).
The District Court's Decision Denyina Strange's Motion For A New Trial
On The Basis Of Juror Misconduct Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion

C.

A motion for a new trial may be granted only upon the grounds set forth in
I.C.

5

19-2406. State v. Cantu, 129 ldaho 673, 675, 931 P.2d 1191, 1193

(1997).

Those grounds include jury "misconduct by which a fair and due

consideration of the case has been prevented." I.C. § 19-2406(3). In Idaho,
there is a two prong test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new
trial due to juror misconduct. "First, the defendant must present clear and
convincing evidence that juror misconduct has occurred. Second, the trial court
must be convinced that the misconduct reasonably could have prejudiced fhe
defendant." State v. Reutzel, 130 ldaho 88, 96, 936 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Ct. App.
1997) (emphasis added),

citina State v.

Seiber, 117 ldaho 637, 640, 791 P.2d

l 8 , 2 1 (Ct. App. 1990).
Strange has failed to show that the inability of one or two jurors to hear
everything that transpired in the courtroom due to poor acoustics is jury
misconduct as contemplated by I.C. § 19-2406(3). Although no reported ldaho

case has so held,' other courts have recognized a form of juror misconduct
under the category of 'Turor inattentiveness." Examples of this are when jurors
are found to be napping during the trial, simply not paying attention to the
proceedings, or by other impairment, such as intoxication during the
proceedings. See, e.g., Samad v. U.S. 812 A.2d 226 (D.C. 2002) (brief lapses in
jurors' attention that are not prejudicial may be excused; prolonged
inattentiveness, however, jeopardizes the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial before a tribunal that is both impartial and
mentally competent); People v. Kinq, 121 P.3d 234 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005)
(defendant was not entitled to have an apparently sleeping juror replaced with an
alternate juror; although the trial court observed that the juror had his eyes
closed on occasion, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to support
the conclusion that he had actually been asleep or missed substantial portions of
the evidence); Chubb v. State, 640 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1994) (affidavit of spectator
that he observed juror asleep during portions of trial was insufficient to establish
juror inattentiveness and to demonstrate prejudice, where the affidavit failed to
specify identity or duration of specific portion of trial missed, juror's alleged
inattentiveness had not contemporaneously brought to court's attention for

'

Cf., State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437, 440-41, 146 P.3d 703, 706-707 (Ct. App.
2006) ("if the defendant or his counsel know that a juror is sleeping or otherwise
inattentive and the matter is not brought to the attention of the trial court, postverdict relief will not be granted pursuant to a motion for a new trial"). The State
notes that issues of jurors being able to hear were raised and addressed during
or before trial, but Strange did not at that time move for a mistrial or claim that
the district court's corrective measures were inadequate. (See, e.q., Tr., p. 135,
L. 18 - p. 136, L. 20 (Juror Russell had trouble hearing until provided a hearing
device.).)

determination of whether juror was actually sleeping, and juror's mere falling
asleep for short time did not necessarily constitute sufficient cause for new trial
in absence of convincing explanation as to how defendant was thereby deprived
of his rights); and State v. Chesnut, 643 SW.2d 343 (Tenn. 1982) (court held that
a motion for new trial based on the fact that two jurors fell asleep during the
prosecution's case was properly denied, where the jurors at most missed five
minutes of testimony over the course of a three-day trial, and where testimony
concerning the same matters was elicited from other witnesses).
These cases involve jury misconduct because they involve affirmative
action by jurors. A mere inability to hear everything is not misconduct by jurors,
and therefore not grounds for a new trial motion. Strange has therefore failed to
show error in the denial of his motion as a matter of law. Even if a mere inability
to hear every word spoken in the courtroom could be considered "misconduct,"
Strange has shown no error. In this case, the trial court "went the extra mile" to
investigate whether some jurors may not have been able to hear. (R., pp. 8081). The trial court held a hearing, polled the jurors, and took testimony from
each. (Tr., p. 131, L. 3 - p. 139, L. 3.) Although a few of the jurors admitted they
occasionally had difficulty hearing a sentence or two here or there, there was no
indication that many on the jury panel were deprived of being able to hear
substantial portions of trial testimony. (R., pp. 96-97; Tr., p. 133, L. 5 - p. 138, L.
22.)
The district court found that the testimony of the jurors at the post-trial
hearing established that there was no basis "to undermine the jury verdict nor to

determine that the jurors were unable to receive the evidence as presented,"
because the acoustics of the courtroom were "sufficient for hearing all testimony
and instructions of the Court." (R., p. 96.) Strange has not demonstrated that he
was prejudiced by the courtroom's acoustics. He has not shown that any juror
missed evidence or instructions necessary to reach a fair verdict. As such, the
district court's factual findings that there was no basis to conclude that the verdict
was undermined or that the jury was unable to receive the evidence have not
been shown to be in error. Likewise, Strange has failed to show an abuse of
discretion in the district court's conclusion that he was not prejudiced.
CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that the order of the district court denying
Strange's motion for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct be affirmed.
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